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Since Husserl – who, while attempting, in Ideas, to account for what
really takes place in experience – introduced for the first time the concept
of  horizon as the foremost instrument of  his analytic of  intentionality
(in order to conceptualize and analyze the specific mode of
apprehension of  the contextuality in which all experience of  things
takes place, that is, the pre-predicative assumption in natural life of  the
existence of  the world, or the co-meant existence of  the world in all
judgments about particular things), any reference to this concept in
phenomenological or post-phenomenological thought is also a reference
to “world.” Indeed, Husserl was the first to provide a thoughtfully
developed concept of  the world as a horizon which guides all
understanding of  whatever is encountered in the world. As a lawfully
ordered interconnectedness of  sense references, the “world,” whether
a particular world, or the One world which we all have in common,
names the circumference, or frame, within which things can appear as
things experienced, and which guides their intelligibility at all levels of
understanding. However different, both the particular worlds and the
One world are horizons. In natural experience, “the vital horizon
[lebendiger Horizont]” of  the active apperception of  transcendent things
is made up of  the open infinity of  all potential perceptions (based on
all that which is given in non-thematic fashion, together with the thing
in focus) as well as by a thing’s proximity to the other things by which
it always finds itself  surrounded.1 By contrast, the universal horizon of
the One world is the open space for the manifold particular worlds
with their mobile and hence expandable and modifiable horizons, and
which thus also transcends them as the universal dimension that makes
all horizonal appearing and experience possible.
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In his discussion of  the life-world in Chapter III of  The Crisis
of  the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology Husserl makes a
sharp distinction between the way particular things are apprehended
within their own particular worlds, and the world horizon itself. Whereas
in “normal, unbroken, coherent life ... world is the universal field into
which all our acts, whether of  experiencing, of  knowing, or of  outward
action, are directed” without any explicit or thematic awareness of  the
horizonality of  experience, the world as universal horizon is the result
of  a reflective attitude directed at the different ways in which the
conscious having of  the world occurs in natural life.2 Only in this new
universal direction of  interest does horizonality become thematic. As
Elisabeth Ströker notes:
‘Horizonality’ is not a title for a descriptively discovered
complex within the natural attitude, but rather a title for
what is phenomenologically exhibited in pure
consciousness. As the basic structure of  the objectively
appearing world, it requires a search for the corresponding
processes on the side of  experience. For according to the
universal a priori correlation between world and
consciousness, the world must present itself  in
consciousness, and consciousness must maintain the
structural conditions for the constitution of  the world.3
The One world which transcends all other particular worlds – the koinon,
or universal world – is something distinct from a partial horizon. But
in no way does the One world horizon amount to a universalizing
expansion of  one such particular horizon, nor of  the sum total of  all
particular horizons. The horizon of  horizons, which can never be
adequately apprehended in intuitive self-givenness, must be built, as a
reading of  The Crisis would demonstrate, from an analysis of  the
intersubjective meaning-giving acts of  a transcendental Ego sedimented
in the particular horizons of  the life-world. The ultimate horizon of
the One world is, indeed, an idea, more precisely, an idea in the Kantian
sense.
The concept of  horizon and, in particular, the world-horizon
– understood either as the product of  intersubjective meaning
constitution (Husserl); or as that which guides all understanding of
Being, namely, time (Heidegger); or as the extra-subjective objectivity
that underpins all functions of  the understanding of  beings in the
sphere of  phenomenality (Patoèka) – plays a considerable role in
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Derrida’s thought as well. From early on he has repeatedly broached
this theme which, in Sur Parole, he even termed “a grand philosophical
question.”4 Yet, considering the capital importance in phenomenological
thought of  this concept, it is somewhat surprising, at first, to remark
that on almost all occasions at which Derrida raises the question of  the
horizon, he is strongly critical of  it.5 Although Derrida’s treatment of
this concept would warrant an extensive discussion, we must confine
ourselves to some very succinct remarks. First, however, a brief  reminder
of  the Greek origin of  the word may be appropriate. “Horizon” derives
from the verb horizein, to divide or separate from, as a border or
boundary. Horismos means limit, and horizon is a separating circle. Not
only does the verb horizein thus refer to a marking out, or a tracing of
borders by which a setting into limits occurs, according to Liddel and
Scott, it also signifies “to ordain,” “to determine”, and “ to lay down.”
Now, for Derrida, a horizon is “an inevitably totalizing horizon,” and
on occasion he even speaks of  it as being “dark, threatening and
threatened.”6 One of  Derrida’s earliest discussions of  Husserl’s concept
of  horizon occurs in his 1962 commentary on Husserl’s “Origin of
Geometry,” where Husserl defines the world (i.e., “the universe of
Objects insofar as it is linguistically expressible in its being and its being-
such”) as the infinite horizon of  every possible experience. Derrida
writes:
Thus, the signification of  the world as horizon is clearly
explicated, i.e., as the infinitely open common place for
everything we can encounter in front of  and for ourselves.
In front of  and for ourselves implies, then, given as an
object. The world, therefore, is essentially determined by
the dative and horizontal dimension of  being perceived
(l’être-perçu) in a gaze whose object must always be able to
be a theorem. Geometrical exemplariness undoubtedly
results from the fact that, as an ‘abstract’ material science,
this exemplariness treats the spatiality of  bodies (which is
only one of  the body’s eidetic components), i.e., treats
what confers sense on the notion of horizon and object.
Despite all the antagonistic motifs which animate
phenomenology, space’s privilege therein is in certain
respects remarkable. It testifies to that ‘objectivist’
tendency which Husserl simultaneously opposes so
vigorously, and yet which is only a period, an essential,
and therefore irreducible, movement of  thought.7
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In Husserlian phenomenology, horizonality, or the world as a horizon,
is thus a concept that is fundamentally linked to the bodily and spatial
structures of  the universe, the very same ones on which, as we have
shown elsewhere, the theoretical gaze that found expression in the
exact sciences bases its claim of  universality. The horizon is the infinite
spatial openness for the manifestation of  everything that lets itself  be
encountered as a bodily object, and it draws its very meaning from this
eidetic component of  bodily things. But, as is also clear, the world of
objects and, mutatis mutandis, the horizon (if  indeed the latter pertains,
first and foremost, to corporeal things in space) is not, for Husserl, the
entire world. Husserl’s transcendentalist approach to the life-world, his
search for a more encompassing universality than the one offered by
the sciences, therefore stands in an antagonistic relation to this very
notion of  horizonality. But in spite of  the fact that Husserl, in The
Crisis of  the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, sought to
open the horizon up to include the universal structure of  the
accomplishments of  world-constitution by the intersubjective acts of
the transcendental ego, the objectivist conception of  the horizon, as
Derrida would seem to suggest, continues to cast a shadow on Husserl’s
broader conception of  horizonality. If  in his later works Derrida then
speaks of  the necessity to exceed, pierce, perforate, puncture, or even
burst open the horizon, something, indeed, that from a
phenomenological perspective can only be, if  not simply a provocation,
then at least complete nonsense, it is first of  all in order to break the
hold of  geometry on the horizon or, more accurately, on our way of
thinking world and universality.
This outrageous demand to pierce the horizon rests first and
foremost on Derrida’s inquiry into the coming about, or, what he also
calls, the “invention of  the entirely other” – invention, since in distinction
from the programmable other who arrives in the order of  the same,
one has to prepare for the entirely other – that is, a coming about “that
allows the coming of  a still unanticipatable alterity and for which no
horizon of  waiting as yet seems ready, in place, available.”8 More
generally, the demand in question devolves from Derrida’s probing of
the nature of  an event, and from his examination of  the necessary
conditions of  eventness. In “The University Without Condition,”
Derrida contends that “if  there is any, if  there is such a thing [as an
event], the pure singular eventness of  what arrives or of  who arrives and
arrives to me (which is what I call the arrivant), it would suppose an
irruption that punctures the horizon, interrupting any performative
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organization, any convention, or any context that can be dominated by
a conventionality.”9 Even though Derrida takes issue here with the
rules and conventions that, according to speech act theory, make a
performative event possible, one can extend his critique of  conventions
and conventionality to the whole sphere of  doxical beliefs, customs,
and habits. Without the interruption, not only of  the horizonality of  a
theorizable world of  objects, but also of  the horizon of  expectations,
anticipations, and precomprehensions characteristic of  the life-world,
no event, strictly speaking, will ever be able to occur. To take this one
step further: without piercing the horizon, whether in the sense of
episteme, or in the sense of  doxa; without bursting open the objectivist
horizon of  the exact sciences, or the subjectivist one of  everyday beliefs,
conventions, and expectations, no world worth its name – that is, no
universal world – can come into being.
Let us keep the broader implications of  Derrida’s demand to
burst open the horizon in mind as we now return to a discussion of
some of  his critical observations about the phenomenological concept
of horizon. Especially when horizon is understood as “a horizon of
anticipation or precomprehension,” a formulation which recalls
Husserl’s talk, in Experience and Judgment, of  the “structure of  anticipation
and fulfillment” characteristic of  a horizon, a horizon is seen as “a
horizon, period,” and is subject to suspicion.10 In “Force of  Law,” for
example, Derrida writes: “One of  the reasons I’m keeping such a
distance from all these horizons – from the Kantian regulative idea or
from the messianic advent, for example, or at least from their
conventional interpretation – is that they are, precisely horizons. As its
Greek name suggests, a horizon is both the opening and the limit of
that opening that defines an infinite progress or a period of  waiting.”11
Derrida’s criticism of  the notion of  horizon – which, as I have already
remarked earlier, occurs in particular in his discussion of  what constitutes
an event – aims at dislocating the space in which something takes place,
in which it is opened up, but, by the same stroke, is also encased within
certain limits. In his commentary on Husserl’s “Origin of  Geometry,”
Derrida had already pointed out that the notion of  horizon in Husserl’s
phenomenology concerns the concrete – because experienced –
conditions of  possibility of  history, that is, “a primordial knowledge”
presupposed by “the totality of  possible historical experiences.” He
notes: “Horizon is the always-already-there of  a future which keeps
the indetermination of  its infinite openness even though this future
was announced to consciousness. As the structural determination of  every
RODOLPHE GASCHE
6
material indeterminacy, a horizon is always virtually present in every
experience; for it is at once the unity and the incompletion for that
experience – the anticipated unity in every incompletion.”12
Besides being intimately linked to world, horizonality is also
determinative of  history insofar as the latter concerns the expansion
of  the world to the One universal world that is shared by all. The
paradox of  the horizon however is that it both opens up the
indeterminacy of  the future while closing it in the same breath by
anticipating what that future brings. Yet, while in this early Derridean
text the horizon only seems to anticipate structurally and determine
the future in advance, it does not seem to interfere with the material
indeterminacy of  the latter. By contrast, all references to the horizon in
Derrida’s later work would seem to suggest that, as a structure of
anticipation and precomprehension, the horizon also encroaches on
the material indeterminacy of  future events, and this to such a degree
that any history (and by the same token, any world worth its name)
becomes impossible. Indeed, structured by anticipation and
precomprehension, the horizon describes a space (and a time) in which
whatever happens, or takes place, remains controllable and
programmable – always already possible – in short, anticipatable and
even calculable. What occurs within a horizon “is of  the order of  the
masterable possible, it is the unfolding of  what is already possible. It is
of  the order of  power, of  the ‘I can,” ‘I may,’ or ‘I am empowered to...’.
No surprise, thus no event in the strong sense.” Where there is a horizon,
“an event worthy of  the name cannot arrive. If  what arrives belongs to
the horizon of  the possible, or even of  a possible performative, it does
not arrive, it does not happen, in the full sense of  the word.”13 Now
since, within the horizon, an event can only take place on the condition
that the horizon master it as something possible in advance (thereby
precluding any surprise), Derrida proclaims the need to exceed, pierce,
perforate, puncture, or even burst open the horizon (all these being
expressions that mark his discussion of horizonality).
Already in “Signature, Event, Context,” where horizonality is
discussed in terms of  the communication of  consciousnesses or
presences within which the linguistic and semantic transport of  meaning
(vouloir-dire) occurs (as well as in terms of  the semantic and hermeneutic
horizon, that is, the horizon of  sense which commands the notion of
communication within which all meaning takes place), the nuclear traits
characteristic of  writing (in the sense of  arche-writing) were said to
exceed and puncture [excédé ou crevé] these horizons.14 In a debate over
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the hermeneutic conception of  the horizon in Spurs, Derrida adds that
“reading [as well], which is to relate to writing, is to perforate such an
horizon or the hermeneutic veil.”15 As we have pointed out, in speaking
of  eventness Derrida observes that if  there is such a thing as an “event
in the strong sense ... it would suppose an irruption that punctures [crève]
the horizon.” 16 Furthermore, in regards to “revolution,” understood
as an interruption of, and a radical caesura in, the ordinary course of
history, that is, as an event which does not let itself  be pre-programmed,
Derrida notes that “in a certain way, as the only event worthy of  the
name, [a revolution] exceeds every possible horizon, every horizon of  the
possible – and therefore of  potency and power.”17 However, if  the thought
of  the event – or for that matter of  revolution, responsibility, decision,
the coming of  the other, and so forth – requires exceeding, puncturing,
piercing, or perforating the horizon, this in no way implies abandoning
or simply doing away with the horizon altogether. However provocative
the talk in question may be, puncturing the horizon does not entail the
all-out rejection of  phenomenological horizonality.
Undoubtedly, Derrida has occasionally, linked the occurrence
of  an event to the absence altogether of  a horizon. In Sur Parole, he
remarks: “It is the absence of  the horizon which is the condition of
the event ... The absence of  the horizon causes fear, but it is perhaps
the condition for something unheard of  to happen.”18 However, as
Derrida’s reference, in For What Tomorrow ... A Dialogue, to the necessity
of  “maintain[ing a] horizon without horizon,” if  something such as
unconditional hospitality is to be thought demonstrates, the notion of
horizon is not to be relinquished once and for all.19 It is certainly true,
as Helmut Kuhn remarks, that “by its very nature every horizon is
‘open.’ As we move from the center toward the circumference fresh
horizons open up. We are constantly invited to transcend the boundary
of  our field or vision.” 20 But it is also true that all these horizons are at
the same time framed by what, in Husserl’s words, is “the horizon of
all horizons” – that is, the ultimate foundation of  all actual and potential
experience in an idea, which although merely regulative, and hence
only the object of  an infinite approximation or fulfillment, nonetheless
suggests a pre-closed whole. In his call for the puncturing of  the horizon,
Derrida would then seem to extend to the horizon of  all horizons, i.e.,
the universal horizon of  the world, the constitutive transcendence of
all particular horizons. However, if  the horizon of  all horizons is an
idea in the Kantian sense, this horizon, rather as something always
already given, is, as one could show on the basis of  the last part of  The
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Crisis, also a horizon in the making, if  it is not even an idea itself  in the
making. In light of  Derrida’s emphasis, in “Violence and Metaphysics,”
that, contrary to what Levinas contends, Husserl never held that the
perception of  a transcendent thing could be completed in full
adequation (and hence, could be fully determined once and for all),
and that the infinite horizons within which a thing is experienced can
not be reduced to disposable present objects, the call for puncturing
the horizon could in a certain way be tantamount to thinking faithfully
Husserl’s conception of  horizon (as an idea in the Kantian sense) to its
radical conclusion. Indeed, in the essay in question, Derrida points out
that
the Idea in the Kantian sense designates the infinite
overflowing of  a horizon which, by reason of  an absolute
and essential necessity which itself  is absolutely principled
and irreducible, never can become an object itself  , or be
completed, equaled, by the intuition of  an object . ... In
phenomenology there is never a constitution of  horizons,
but horizons of  constitution. That the infinity of  the
Husserlian horizon has the form of  an indefinite opening,
and that it offers itself without any possible end to the
negativity of  constitution (of  the work of  objectivation)
– does this not certainly keep it from all totalization, from
the illusion of the immediate presence of a plenitudinous
infinity in which the other suddenly becomes unfindable?21
As an idea in the Kantian sense, the ultimate horizon which frames all
other horizons can thus not be a constituted totality. Yet, even though
nothing which takes place in it is ever fully determinable, this horizon,
notwithstanding the impossibility of  ever providing a definite sense
for that which occurs within it, remains something with respect to
which everything that occurs becomes intelligible. If  alterity is to have
a chance to manifest itself, then even a horizon that can only be
approximated in an infinite process must be pierced.
While only a burst horizon could allow something singular –
that is, something other, hence, incalculable – to occur, an unforeseeable
event is one that is also “necessarily without horizon.”22 However, in
the same way as a “horizon without horizon” implies the freeing of
the horizon of its enclosing circumference within, and with respect to
which, alone, things can and must appear without therefore relinquishing
all relation to it, just so does an event without horizon merely refer to
a given horizon’s inability semantically to saturate in advance the sense
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of  such an event, and thus to strip it of  its singularity. To be recognized
as an unforeseeable and radically singular event (as something universal,
to the extent that it does not yield to inexorably particular expectations
and pre-comprehensions), the event – a singular universal, as it were –
must at the same time burst open the horizon, be without a horizon,
and negotiate its lack of  intelligibility with some sort of  horizon in
order to be experienced and recognized as a singular event.
Phenomenologically speaking, the demand to do away with the horizon
as such is an absurdity, but as the formula of  a “horizon without
horizon” (or of  an event without horizon), indicates, any call to puncture
the horizon seeks first and foremost not only the cutting open of
particular horizons (even if  they may not have those “firm walls,” or
more precisely, the “walls hard as steel (stahlharte Wand)” which, according
to Max Scheler, enclose the “milieu” of  human beings, that is, their
worlds, or in Husserlian terms, their homeworlds), but above all the
cutting open of  the ultimate meaning-giving horizon, the universal
horizon of  the world, in order for an experience of  alterity to be possible,
and to open the space for the unforeseeable to come.23 Only by bursting
open the horizon qua “horizon of  the wait,” in relation to which one
waits only for what one already expects in advance; only by “awaiting
without a horizon of  the wait,” is a “just opening” toward “the event
that cannot be awaited as such, or recognized in advance therefore,
[possible], to the event as the foreigner itself, to her or him for whom
one must leave an empty place, always, in memory of  the hope.”24
However, if  an event is “what comes to pass only once, a single
time, a first and last time, in an always singular, unique, exceptional,
irreplaceable, unforeseeable, and incalculable fashion,” in short, “what
happens or who happens precisely there where ... one no longer sees it
coming, no longer horizontally: without prospect or horizon,” then for an
event to happen not only is the end (la fin) of  the horizon required, but
also – implicated by the latter – the end of  “teleology, the calculable
program, foresight, and providence.”25 Indeed, wherever there is a
horizon, whatever happens is seen to be coming from, or to happen in
light of this horizon. A horizon as a horizon of pre-comprehension is
always already also a horizon of  anticipation and teleological
determination. Whatever happens within it has therefore already been
present in some way.
It has already arrived or happened and is thus neutralized
in its irruption. Everywhere there is a horizon and where
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we can see something coming from out of  some teleology
or ideal horizon, some horizon of  an idea, that is, from
out of  the seeing (voir) or the knowing (savoir) of  an eidos,
everywhere that ideality is possible ... this horizontal
ideality, the horizon of  this ideality, will have neutralized
in advance the event, along with everything that, in any
historicity worthy of  this name, requires the eventfulness
of  the event.26
Derrida’s reservation regarding all horizons includes the one provided
by the idea in a Kantian sense, that is, not only by an idea of  adequate
determinability to which everything converges as towards a limit on
which, however, it never fully closes in, but also as that from which
everything that occurs is already ideally prefigured, progressively
accomplishing it, even if  there is no ultimate fulfillment to this process.27
A horizon as a Kantian idea, as a regulative idea for every event, is
consequently also something which neutralizes the event in its very
unpredictability – and hence, the singularity – that alone makes it an
event worthy of  the name. A horizon which thus serves as a telos of
both pre-comprehension and anticipation is by the same token that
which also inhibits all historicity. Derrida writes:
Whenever a telos or teleology comes to orient, order, and
make possible a historicity, it annuls that historicity by the
same token and neutralizes the unforeseeable and
incalculable irruption, the singular and exceptional alterity
of  what (ce qui) comes, or indeed of  who (qui) comes, that
without which, or the one without whom, nothing
happens or arrives. It is not only the question of  the telos
that is posed here but that of the horizon and of any
horizontal seeing-come in general.28
What follows from all of  this is that if  the horizon is the horizon of
the world, and in particular of  the world that is common to all, i.e., the
universal world, this world is not the world since in it every event is
instantly neutralized: It would be a world, in which nothing happens,
and thus not a world at all. Strictly speaking, the world opened up by
the horizon is enclosed within limits that prevent anything non-
anticipated and non-precomprehended from happening within its
overture. It is, therefore, not an openness to begin with, if  openness
implies exposure toward otherness, singularity, the incalculable, the to
come. No world worthy of  its name comes into being within a horizon.
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A first condition for a world to open up would thus entail bursting
open the horizon as anticipatory and teleological – and that always
means archeo-teleological – determination. But although no world
worthy its name can come into being within a horizon, a horizon is
also required to prevent the horizonless world from becoming an un-
world – a monstrous “world.”
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